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Abstract 
 
If time-sensitive relief is to be dispatched to a far-away location, the decision to do so – 
the “entry” decision – has to be taken within hours after the disaster for the relief to make an 
impact.  This paper aims to identify which information sources that become available to the 
decision maker at what time after a potential disaster, and to establish how the provided 
information can be best utilized based on its inherent and accumulated quality.  The research 
encompasses 46 case studies in central Asia in the period from 1993 to 2003.  The study 
makes clear that a decision-maker will only benefit from satellite imagery if the time 
required to deliver a digested product to the decision maker is reduced to a matter of hours 
or if the area of interest is so remote or widespread that the time necessary for on-site reports 
exceeds that of acquiring and interpreting remotely sensed imagery.  In conclusion, model-
based decision support systems are important since they provide an early alert that enables 
other sources to quicker provide information that is more refined.   
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1 Introduction 
It is widely accepted that pre-emptive measures in disaster prone regions, such as 
causal oriented institutional support for mitigation and preparedness efforts, is arguably a 
more cost efficient form of aid compared to traditional palliative post-disaster response 
(Smillie et al. 2003:25).  Nevertheless, as shown by Olsen et al (2003) the media attention given 
to disasters, and the political incentive to respond to them, will continue to create a popular 
interest in donor nations to provide immediate help to those suffering.  Accepting that 
international responses will continue in one form or another, this study investigates how 
existing channels of information could be used to provide optimal support to the decision-
making process in the responding international organisations, from the beginning to the end 
of the emergency phase following a rapid-onset disaster.  
When a natural disaster strikes in a developing country, the undeveloped state of 
local information infrastructure in remote areas may delay the start of any international or 
regional intervention.  The delay can reach to a point, usually within the first couple of days 
(Alexander 2000:46; Alexander 2002:198; Shakhmanranian et al. 2000:148), after which certain 
forms of emergency response, such as Search And Rescue (SAR), are no longer beneficial.  It 
is questionable whether it ever will be possible for expatriates to arrive in time, given that in 
rapid-onset disasters, where SAR is a valid relief alternative, the number of people saved 
drops dramatically after only 6-8 hours.  Examples of this dilemma are the Bam earthquake 
in Iran 2003 in which 1.200 expatriate SAR experts saved only 30 people, and the Armenia 
earthquake in 1988 in which 1.800 expatriate SAR experts saved only 60 people.   
Consequently, if time-sensitive relief is to be dispatched to a far-away location, the 
decision to do so has to be taken within hours after the disaster for the relief to make an 
impact.  If there is no direct communication to a source with precise and reliable information 
on the disaster situation, decision-makers will have to resort to using information from 
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subjective sources, such as the media and local contacts, for developing an informal needs 
assessment1.   
2 Objective and assumptions 
An underlying assumption for this study is that information with a known accuracy 
can be beneficial to the decision-making process even if the accuracy is low.  Supplying 
decision-makers with a schematic overview of the information flow enables the selection of a 
moment when the information envelope — i.e. the difference between the estimated 
minimum and maximum — is of an acceptable breadth to be considered as a trustworthy 
enough foundation for action.   
Among the case studies are events in which an international response took place as 
well as events that involved no international response.  The study does not intend to answer 
the question of whether a response was unwarranted or whether a response should have 
been made in a situation where there was none.  The focus, rather, is on the information flow 
and information availability building up to a decision to take action, or to not take action. 
In essence, it is the objective of this paper to identify which information sources 
becomes available at what time after a potential disaster, and to establish how that 
information can be best utilized based on its inherent and accumulated quality. 
                                                          
1 As opposed to a formal needs assessment as described by Darcy and Hofman (2003) 
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3 Definitions 
The decision to engage in a crisis is termed by European Commission Humanitarian 
Office (ECHO) as the “entry” and the decision to terminate an intervention is termed as the 
“exit”.  ECHO (2003) aims to concentrate relief in the areas with the highest humanitarian 
needs.  ECHO uses five groups of factors closely tied to vulnerability to indicate 
humanitarian need.  In this document need is defined as the quantitative requirement of 
assistance.  The definition of vulnerability is close to that of IFRC (1999) combined with the 
social and hazard dependent vulnerability aspects as presented by Schneiderbauer and 
Ehrlich (2004).  Loss means the sum of the damage that a hazard causes on the affected 
society, e.g. the loss of life, structures, or financial means.  Hazard data are the attributes and 
characteristics of a hazard.  In the case of earthquakes these include epicentre location, 
magnitude, hypocentral depth, and time. 
3.1 Data quality 
All data has an inherent quality.  Data quality can be divided into Accuracy and 
Completeness.  Accuracy relates to the lack of errors in the data — i.e. the difference between 
the stored value and the measured reality.  Completeness refers to the lack of omission errors 
in the database — i.e. if all desired aspects of an object are stored.  (Vereign 1998) 
The data quality also depends on the intended use of the data.  If the basic seismic 
data is intended to be used for describing where an event took place, it could be seen as 
complete, but if the intention is to say whether the event requires an international response, 
it can be considered incomplete. 
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4 Method 
In this study, earthquakes are examined as an archetypal form of rapid-onset 
disasters.  The limited geographical impact and the general availability of information, 
software tools, and models make earthquakes well-defined and tangible phenomena 
compared to other forms of natural disasters.  In addition, earthquakes are a truly rapid 
onset type of disaster.  Earthquakes are thus a suitable choice in relation to the more abstract 
and complex disasters such as food-security crises and conflicts.  As the data and models 
used in loss and needs assessment in other types of natural disasters are in many ways 
different from those used in earthquakes, a more inclusive approach would have made the 
task of analysing data quality too vast.   
This study entails 46 earthquake events that occurred in the central Asian region in 
the period from 1993 to 2003.  The central Asian countries considered in the study are 
Afghanistan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.  The 
Xinjang and Xizang provinces of China are also included.  Its high seismicity and the high 
vulnerability to earthquakes of its vernacular housing and infrastructure make the region a 
suitable choice for case studies to fulfil the objective of the research.  These cases were 
selected with the aim of including all earthquakes for which information existed in any one 
source.  Multiple areas and cases were selected with aim of providing a base of events that 
allow for generalisation, as described by Thomas (1998).  The study uncovered no cases 
where advanced forms of decision support systems had supported operational decisions.  
Several such systems were field-tested in the 2003 Boumerdes earthquake in Algeria.  The 
Boumerdes earthquake is consequently included in the study in order to fill the gap. 
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Table 1: Studied earthquakes per year and country2 
Country/Year 1
9
9
3 
1
9
9
4 
1
9
9
5 
1
9
9
6 
1
9
9
7 
1
9
9
8 
1
9
9
9 
2
0
0
0 
2
0
0
1 
2
0
0
2 
2
0
0
3 
Sum 
Afghanistan 0 1 0 1 0 2 1 1 2 3 0 11 
China3 1 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 
Iran 1 3 0 0 3 3 3 2 1 3 0 19 
Kazakhstan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Kyrgyzstan 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Pakistan 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 14 2 0 5 
Tajikistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 
Turkmenistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Uzbekistan5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Annual Sum 2 5 06 3 7 5 4 5 4 9 2 46 
 
The reference dataset for events in central Asia is based on information derived 
from the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), the United Nations 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), the world’s news media, 
various donors7, seismological institutions, national and international NGOs, and scientific 
institutions8.  Before 1999, the main media source used in the study is a database constructed 
for this purpose with articles produced mainly by AFP, AP, Reuter, and UPI.  From 1999, the 
Internet has served as the main source of news articles since by that time it had matured and 
contained a broad selection of archived material.  For each case study, information was 
gathered on the information technology and data usage over time, similar to Comfort (2000), 
as well as the change in the reported data over time for all sources. 
                                                          
2 The country is determined by the location of the epicentre even in cases where the major impact was in a different country.  
The 2003 Algeria earthquake is not displayed in this table. 
3 Only Xinjang and Xizang provinces. 
4 This epicentre was in Gujarat in India. 
5 The 2003 earthquake in Kazakhstan had an impact on Uzbekistan, but no events of interest with epicentres in Uzbekistan were 
identified during the period. 
6 No events of interest during 1995. 
7 Mainly ECHO and member states of the European community. 
8  For instance EERI (2003) and Kaji (1998) 
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A set of decision support tools and methods were reviewed as part of the study.  
The selected routines are:  
¾ the Disaster Alert Tool of the European Commission Joint Research Centre 
(de Groeve 2002),  
¾ the UN Risk Assessment tool for Diagnosis of Urban areas against Seismic 
disasters tool - also known as the RADIUS tool (UN ISDR 2001),  
¾ and the Quakeloss9 method (Shakhramanian et al. 2000) of the World Agency 
of Planetary Monitoring and Earthquake Risk Reduction (WAPMERR).   
These tools were selected based on their availability and relative ease of application 
on a global scale.  The tools were applied on a subset of the case study events with the aim of 
testing the usability of their output.  Their operational time-constraints were estimated by 
applying them, in real-time, on events that occurred during the course of this study10.  The 
review did not focus on the underlying logic of the tools and methods but rather on the 
required input and the usability of the output — assuming a black box approach.  The 
possibility to include alternative methods such as the statistical models created by Gutierrez 
et al. (2004) and Badal et al. (2004) was investigated.  However, those methods had not yet 
reached the maturity required to apply them to the selected case studies. 
5 The entry decision 
The occasions in which “entry” decision support is of importance are not the high 
impact humanitarian cases for which the necessity of an international response is obvious, 
but rather the intermediate humanitarian-impact events where the demand for an 
international response is not immediately apparent.  The remoteness of an area or aspects 
such as vulnerability or reduced local coping capacities can obscure the need.  Sending needs 
assessment experts to a disaster location takes time.  The intention is that a needs assessment 
                                                          
9  Only a set of output data was analysed.  The method as described by Shakhramanian represents the core of the Quakeloss 
method. 
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team should reach a disaster area within 24 hours (UNDAC, 2003) after the relevant 
authorities have taken the decision to send them.  The more time-sensitive form of relief, 
such as SAR teams or medical supplies that needs to be purchased and shipped, can do little 
good past the first couple of days after an event (Shakhramanian et al. 2000) has taken place.   
Simplified, the situation for the decision-makers immediately after a disaster is the 
following:  The decision can be taken based on the available information or one can wait for 
information with higher quality.  However, the longer the waiting time, the lower the benefit 
of a potential response effort.  Benini et al. (2005) suitably term this equilibrium, that is seen 
in several domains of development and disaster management, as “Speed kills vs. Victims 
cannot wait”.  In these cases, making an extemporaneous decision, thus shortening the 
response time and using information of lower quality, increases the risk of a suboptimal 
decision.  Moreover, the commitment of valuable assets, including needs assessment experts, 
to an event that turns out not to be a disaster could result in a reduction of the resources 
available for future disasters.   
The lack of high quality information is not always the source of a temporal 
bottleneck in disaster response.  Political agendas in both the responding nation(s) and the 
affected nation(s) can postpone the acceptance of an event as being a disaster.  Olsen et al. 
(2003) argued that media attention could occasionally add confusion and delay or distort the 
response even further by giving disproportioned exposure to an event.  However, Koethe 
(2003) show that a rule-driven automated analysis of data provides an objective platform to 
inform political decision-makers in affected nations, media, and the public of the probable 
need.  Thus, high quality information has the potential to accelerate and improve the 
response effort in many regards.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
10  The February 2004 earthquake in Moroco and the December 2003 earthquake in Iran. 
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5.1 Decision support 
One mean of facilitating the decision process is to apply Decision Support Systems 
(DSS).  A DSS can help a decision maker in various aspects.  In the field of business 
administration Andersen and Gottschalk (2001) divide DSS users into Strategic, Tactical, and 
Operational decision-makers — see Table 2.  
Table 2 DSS in business management (Gottschalk 2002, modified) 
Type of DSS Users Users’ requirements Questions 
Strategic 
control 
Very few Unstable, not known in advance What kind of business, product, and market? 
Tactical 
control 
Not so many, 
but in different 
dept. 
Mostly stable Given the business, what kinds of resource is 
needed and how it is best developed? 
Operational 
control 
Many, in 
different dept. 
Stable, except for changes in 
products  
Given the business and resource, how it is 
best utilized? 
Drawing an analogy from business management to disaster response, what is the 
role of the users of DSS in the international disaster relief organisation?  Darcy and Hofman 
(2003) see needs assessment as a process of informing the decision-maker in relation to four 
main questions:  
¾ Whether to intervene; 
¾ The nature and scale of the intervention; 
¾ Prioritisation and allocation of resources; and 
¾ Programme design and planning 
These four questions are reiterated down through the hierarchy of the relief 
organisation.  The “Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster 
Response”(McConnan 2000:58) lists further, more detailed, questions encountered by staff in 
the field.  Combining the questions posed by McConnan (2000) and by Darcy and Hofman 
(2003) with the theories of Andersen and Gottschalk (2001) the approximate roles of the 
decision-makers in an international relief organisation can be deduced.   
Comparing disasters in several countries, the strategic decision-maker decides to 
which type of disasters and in which locations his or her organisation can provide the best 
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quality of intervention and determines the appropriate nature and scale of such an 
intervention, often in financial terms.  In line with what Comfort (1993) describes, a re-
iteration occurs when the tactical decision-maker encounter the same questions but on an on-
site level where given physical resources such SAR assets have to be assigned on a priority 
basis among cities, blocks, and buildings.  The two types of decision-makers do not have to 
be members of the same organisation.  A strategic decision-maker can be part of an 
organisation that does not have direct access to relief material, but supports relief actions 
through funding.  In small organisations, the strategic decision maker may also be the 
tactical decision maker.  In other words, the person deciding whether to respond to a disaster 
is also the one who manages the response of the organisation on-site. 
A generic strategic DSS bases its calculations on contextual support methodology as 
explained by Kersten (2000) with focus on “analysis & reasoning” combined with “judgement 
refinement”.  In contrast, the tactical DSS assists by keeping track of what has been done, 
what is left to do, and how to do it in an optimal fashion —much in line with a structural 
support method (Kersten 2000). 
 Table 3 clarifies the decision sequence during the phases immediately before and 
after a disaster based upon the combination of the theories of Darcy and Hofman (2003) and 
Andersen and Gottschalk (2001).  Being the actor that takes the initial decisions, the strategic 
decision-maker is in focus in this study.   
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Table 3: The decision sequence in international disaster response (own) 
Time Phase Task Decision-
maker 
Question/Decision 
Event alert Phenomena 
Experts 
What is the nature and location of the event? 
Loss 
assessment 
Is the event a humanitarian disaster? 
Is an international response required? 
What is the optimal nature of the response? 
Disaster impact 
Needs 
assessment 
Strategic level 
What is the optimal scale of the response? 
Which are the affected areas? 
How should the aid be prioritised between the 
areas? 
How should the aid be delivered? 
Response Coordination Tactical level  
When is the emergency phase over? 
What were the lessons learned from the 
response? 
 
↓ 
Recovery/ 
Mitigation 
Policy creation Policy maker 
Should policies with regards to Response, 
Recovery, Mitigation, and Prevention be 
changed? 
5.2 Data criteria 
Table 3 contains a list of the questions that requires answers after a disaster strikes.  
What data is valuable in order to answer those questions in the entry decision-making 
process?  Information inundation of the decision maker is not better than a lack of 
information (Currion 2003).  It is hence of importance to identify which types of data that are 
relevant.  Take the first question: “Is the event a humanitarian disaster?”.  The philosophical 
constituents of a disaster are something that has been analysed in depth in other studies 
(Quarantelli 1998) but what are the quantifiable aspects of a disaster that could support an 
entry decision?  For the entry decision maker, a disaster is an event that requires 
international intervention.  The quantifiable aspects of a disaster can be assigned into four 
distinct categories: (a) hazard data, (b) vulnerability data, (c) loss data, and (d) needs data.   
In the case of earthquakes, seismological institutions provide hazard data (a).  
Selecting the most accurate institution is a challenge, but it is clear that those institutions as a 
group represent the most authorial source for impact data.  Examples of earthquake hazard 
data are epicentre location, magnitude, and hypocentral depth. 
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It is possible to collect and store Vulnerability data (b) before the hazard strikes.  
ECHO applies its in-house Global Needs Assessment (GNA) index, which they update on an 
annual basis.  Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich (2004) investigate how vulnerability relates to 
different natural hazards and identifies sets of indicators that can be collected before a 
disaster strike to form an estimate of the vulnerability of the affected population.  Other 
vulnerability data can be gathered from spatial data warehouses, one example being the 
LandScan population density raster (ORNL 2002).  In essence, since vulnerability data can be 
available before a hazard strikes and since this type of data does not change significantly as 
the event develops, vulnerability data evolution will not be of interest to this study. 
In the mass media, the most common reported indicators of loss (c) are the number of 
deaths, the number of injured, and the number of structures damaged or destroyed.  These 
measures should not be directly translated to a requirement for entry since: 
¾ These are measures of loss and not of needs;   
¾ De Groeve and Eriksson (2005) showed that loss indicators, individually or 
aggregated, only have a weak correlation to the reported need and resulting 
response; 
¾ The definition of the measures can be interpreted in several ways.  For 
instance, it is not always clear that an earthquake is the cause for the death of 
a person that already was in ill health;   
The alternatives to traditional loss measures are not plenty.  Olsen et al. (2003) show 
that other factors such as media coverage, donor interest, and the presence of NGOs are 
good indicators of the level of delivered emergency assistance.  By definition, those factors 
come about after the point at which an “entry” decision has to be taken and are hence not of 
benefit to the decision process.  In the absence of better alternatives loss data will continue to 
have a role in the decision making process and is hence seen an constituent group of 
information.   
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In needs assessment (d), the measurements are more concrete than in loss.  
Government bodies and international coordinating organisations often produce lists in 
which they express needs in absolute numbers of items or personnel deemed to be required.  
However, as the estimated loss forms the basis for the calculation of the amount of need, the 
reports of needs will not come available before the reports on loss.  In addition, quantified 
needs vary over time.  The amount of needs at a particular time is a function of the amount 
of aid received in the area and the amount on its way there.  In an ideal situation, by 
knowing the actual losses sustained by the affected population, and its coping capacity, it 
would be possible to estimate the absolute needs before any external response process is 
initiated.  Even so, as de Ville de Goyet (1993) argues, if the response is not coordinated and 
well-structured with regards to information sharing, the ability to correctly estimate the 
actual need in the disaster area at an exact point in time diminishes as relief arrives in the 
disaster area.   
Since it is the objective of this paper to find the time versus quality dependencies of 
sources, an inclusive approach has been opted for and all available sources containing data 
on hazard, vulnerability, loss, and needs were incorporated. 
6 Data source typology 
Adopting a data source typology facilitates the macroscopic analysis and 
comparison of the available data sources.  By observing an archetypal earthquake, the chain 
of events can be the following.  After an archetypal earthquake occurs in a developing 
country seismological institutions will record the seismic data.  At the site, the affected 
population will be the first to notice the effects of the event.  Mass media and local government 
will receive initial information from the population.  Occasionally, large organisations have 
permanent on-site representatives that dispatch situation reports to their employers.  To 
minimise the delay and increase the objectivity of the information in the early stages, one 
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may refer to one of several existing techniques for conducting formal loss and needs assessments 
remotely.  In the last stage, data from satellite platforms becomes available. 
As presented in Table 4, the information sources can be grouped into (a) On-site 
source such as organisation representatives, local government and reporters, (b) Remotely 
sensed seismic data from seismological institutions, (c) Automated loss and needs 
assessments from models, and (d) Remotely sensed data from satellites.   
Table 4 Data source typology 
On site sources Remote sources 
Eye witnesses Seismological institutions 
Media Loss and needs model output data 
Government Satellites 
6.1 On-site sources 
Some time after the disaster strikes accounts based on eyewitness reports will flow out 
of the country through conventional channels such as mass media or word of mouth.  The 
delay and objectivity of these reports will depend on factors like the skill of the reporter, the 
extent of the event, the remoteness of the event, and the dedication of the local and national 
authorities in sharing information (Keen and Ryle 1996; Cate 1994).   
Benini (1998) point out that the highest quality data come from the experts, trained 
in making loss or needs assessments, working on the ground in the disaster area.  These 
assessments commonly require days for completion since the experts have to travel to the 
disaster area to collect the sought after information and then compile and disseminate their 
report11.   
Mass media often provide the bulk of the information in the initial stages after an 
event.  Even though the media report themselves tend to be inaccurate it is possible to 
benefit from them by adopting a macroscopic approach.  This can be done by observing the 
frequency of the reports on the subject or the location of the reporters i.e. how many reports 
                                                          
11 Personal communication in November 2003 with P.A Berthlin, rapid response asset manager, Swedish Rescue Services 
Agency (SRSA) 
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have been released.  In addition to the frequency, the location of the reporter can provide 
clues as to the severity of the event.  Responders refer to this as the “black hole” situation12.  
A black hole situation is when it becomes evident that all reports are emanating from around 
the affected area and that the potential media sources in the affected area remain silent.  This 
may indicate that the impact is severe enough to prevent reporting. 
6.2 Remotely sensed seismic data 
In the case of earthquakes, for those not directly affected by the event, the first 
indication that something has occurred comes from seismographs.  Seismic data become 
broadly available minutes after the event (USGS 1997).  Initial seismic data lack hypocentral 
depth, but there will be estimates of the epicentral location and magnitude of the event.  If an 
earthquake is of high magnitude, one can expect that the data is accurate and that the 
approximate focal depth will be known within an hour after the event (USGS 1997) 
depending on the distance to the epicentre from the sensors.  However, even when complete 
and accurate, seismic data alone are not sufficient to judge whether an event will require 
international intervention.  Due to an apparent lack of alternatives, some responding 
organisations13 rely on pure seismic data for providing themselves with an initial alert of the 
occurrence of a potentially serious event.  This gives an alert every time an earthquake 
occurs, even in areas with very low vulnerability, such as those with low population 
densities.  A very imprecise early warning routine is an inappropriate basis for a response, 
but it might still be appropriate for alerting experts of an event that could need further 
investigation. 
                                                          
12  From presentation made by P.A. Berthlin at the GDAS Conference in Geneve, December 2004. 
13 Personal communication in November 2003 with P.A Berthlin, rapid response asset manager, Swedish Rescue Services 
Agency (SRSA) and in February 2004 with Fidel Suarez of the Spanish rescue service. 
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6.3 Automated Loss and Needs assessment models 
In order to rapidly obtain more complete information on the loss in an event, 
without having to access the affected area, models can be applied.  The models are 
commonly based on some function of spatial, or merely numerical, seismic and vulnerability 
data that produce an estimate on one or more of the following variables: population affected, 
number of injured and dead, and structural impact.  The methods applied to arrive at an 
estimate differ from one another, but are either fully automatic or require the involvement of 
a human expert – see Table 5.  For an automated system, the accuracy of the output can 
never exceed that of the input data.  The first and simplest models which could be used after 
an event combine seismic data with proxy data for vulnerability, such as spatial 
demographic data, to form an estimate of the number of affected individuals around the 
epicentre.  Combining these two sets of data is an uncomplicated operation that can be 
performed automatically without human involvement.  This approach gives an estimate of 
population within a set radius of the epicentre.  An example of a tool, reviewed in this 
document, which applies this model is the JRC’s Disaster Alert Tool (de Groeve 2002).  The 
radius within which the population is affected is actually better defined as a simple function 
of magnitude and hypocentral depth (Yuan 2003).  Without the latter, a model output cannot 
exceed the quality of the estimates calculated based on the seismic data alone.  The 
requirement to include hypocentral depth forces these models to await the updated seismic 
reports that contain such data. 
In order to provide more accurate outputs, models that are more intricate 
incorporate additional data to better represent the seismic phenomena and the vulnerability 
of the area.  Applying models that depict the seismic aspects of the earthquake through 
intensity raster diagrams or isoseismic curves improves the representation of the seismic 
pattern of the event.  However, as the number of included factors increases, the task of 
automating the model becomes ever more complex.  This is particularly true when including 
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factors that lack a direct objective relation to the seismic phenomena.  An example of this is 
that the shape and attenuation pattern of the seismic representation can be improved by 
taking into account the proximity of fault lines, the faulting type, the soil type, and the 
topography in the area (Yuan 2003).  It is a very challenging task to incorporate the effect of 
these factors into the seismic picture using an automated model.  A solution is to use human 
experts to refine the seismic representation, at the cost of time and resources.   
To improve the representation of the overall spatial vulnerability, population 
distribution can be combined with data on either structural or social vulnerability.  Such data 
are rarely found with a resolution on sub-national level.  If direct data are not available, 
proxy indicators of vulnerability, such as GDP per capita or the UN’s human development 
index (HDI) can be applied (Chen et al. 1997;Yong et al. 2001).  The level of subjectivity in 
modelling vulnerability is arguably higher than for the seismic models and consequently 
more complex to model automatically.  Despite the difficulty, Shakhramanian et al. (2000) 
showed that it is possible to accomplish.  Nevertheless, the use of human experts is still 
necessary to derive full benefit from the existing ability to model vulnerability. 
Table 5 Reviewed Decision Support Systems according to modelling approach 
Tool Approach Inherent 
Baseline Data 
Coverage Output 
Disaster Alert 
Tool (JRC) 
Simple spatial 
arithmetic 
Demographics Global Affected 
population 
Quakeloss 
(WAPMERR) 
Expert enhanced spatial 
analysis 
Demographics,  
Building quality 
Global Building loss; 
Injured and dead; 
Intensity field 
RADIUS  
(United Nations) 
Spatial analysis leading 
to a risk assessment 
None Can be used globally 
if local baseline data 
exist. 
Building loss; 
Injured and dead; 
Intensity field 
 
In order to use interrelated factors to re-evaluate the input data, the final 
combination of seismic representation with local vulnerability might require human 
involvement — i.e. a seismic characteristic might exert a disproportionate impact on the 
vulnerability or the likelihood of secondary disasters.  Using human experts requires time 
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and, in the end, what governs quality of the output of the models is the readiness to invest 
time and human expertise to refine the quality of the input and output data. 
6.4 Remotely sensed satellite data 
Since this study focuses on disasters in areas with poor infrastructures, the only 
source of remote sensing to produce results in such areas within reasonable time are sensors 
on satellite platforms.  Other platforms such as airplanes and helicopters have to be hired 
and sent to the affected area.  This can be very costly with respect to both time and money.  
Satellites have another advantage in that they circumvent the unwillingness of some states to 
have their territory examined by airborne means.  There are two main possible uses for 
remotely sensed imagery in the response phase following an earthquake:  - 
¾ navigation: in case of insufficient access to up-to-date maps, remotely sensed 
images can help rescue organisations navigate their way through the disaster 
area; and 
¾ loss assessment: using manual and automated methods, the images can be 
analysed in order to detect where damage has been inflicted. 
When replacing the use of a map, optical images are better suited than radar 
imagery, as the former are easier for an inexperienced user to comprehend.  However, 
optical remote sensing requires daylight and the absence of clouds.  These limitations can 
cause a delay in the delivery of the image.  If the image is to be used solely for navigation or 
as a pre-event reference image, it is often possible to find copies in the archives of the image 
providers.  The main weakness of non-optical, radar, images are that they require expert 
interpretation before being used for any purpose and that the resolution is lower than that of 
many optical sensors.  Their main benefits are that they function in all light conditions, 
regardless of the presence of clouds and smoke.   
When performing loss assessment, the two main methods entail using a post-event 
image only or a pair consisting of pre- and post- event images.  Independently from the 
18 
method applied for loss estimation partial damage and damage to the vertical parts on 
structures can seldom be detected. Al-Khudhairy et al. (2002b) apply a semi-automated 
method for detecting severely damaged structures in a post-event image and concluded that 
even though the method is feasible the commission errors are considerable14.  However, one 
important conclusion of their study is that automated damage detection is more accurate 
when applied in rural areas where structures are relatively isolated.  If the inaccuracy of 
automated loss estimation using only a post-event image prevents the information to be used 
for decision support, expert interpretation is required to improve the accuracy. Even with 
expert input only totally collapsed structures that are not hidden in shadows can be 
accurately detected (Shinozuka 2003).   
By applying change detection algorithms on an image pair and using expertise it is 
possible to detect collapsed or even severely damaged buildings with high accuracy 
depending on the method used (Shinozuka 2003; Al-Khudhairy et al. 2002a).  A considerable 
difficulty lies in finding a pre-event image that is compatible with the acquired post-event 
image.  This is particularly true in rural areas and developing countries since image archives 
seldom contain images of such regions.   
Considerable amounts of precious time elapse from when a disaster has occurred to 
when a post-event image – including image acquisition, reception, processing, and delivery – 
is ready to be used by the decision-maker.  Al-Khudhairy and Giada (2002) showed that, not 
including analysis, the total delivery time in an optimal case can be 48 hours but more 
realistically be at least three or four days depending on revisit time of the platform and the 
metrological conditions in the area.  Even though there are many weaknesses in applying 
remote sensing for initial loss assessment, the sensors and methods are constantly improving 
and the reliable detection of damage to complex structures such as bridges and roads will 
soon be possible (Shinozuka 2003; Eguchi 2003).  It is important to remember that even under 
                                                          
14  Using selective object oriented image classification to detect severely damaged or collapsed structures in a rural environment 
the omission errors were 0-25% and the commission errors 14-92% 
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optimal conditions, remote sensing can at best only assist navigation or loss estimation.  
Needs assessment will have to be conducted based on the losses estimated using remote 
sensing combined with other techniques. 
7 The case study results 
Table 6 is produced based on all the information collected on the earthquakes in 
Table 1.  There are many factors affecting the quality and delay in availability of the data.  
Examples of such factors are the state of the local infrastructure and the remoteness of the 
location.  By making the extremes of the case studies visible, a clearer picture emerges.  The 
collated set of information sources for loss and needs assessments found in the case studies 
and their time-versus-quality dependencies are shown in Table 6.  The quantitative 
definitions of the columns Accuracy and Completeness are presented in Table 7.  Accuracy 
indicates how well the data collected at a certain stage corresponds to the reality intended to 
be measured, i.e. how well the reported hypocentral depth corresponds to the actual depth.  
Completeness is divided herein into two indicators.  One related to whether it is possible to 
answer if an international response is required – the first question of Darcy and Hofman 
(2003) – whether there should be a response to an event – and another indicator related to 
how effectively the accumulated data can form the basis for a complete formal needs 
assessment as described by Darcy and Hofman (2003).   
7.1 Data availability in the case studies 
It was impossible to pinpoint the time of availability for some of the reports.  In 
addition, even if a report contains meta-data on when it was produced, in no case does meta-
data indicate when the decision-maker received it.  For instance, reports from the media 
rarely contain more time-related meta-data than the date of release.  In such cases, Table 6 
indicates only the unit of time within which data were made available to decision-makers.  
The information produced by the sources in Table 6 is not uniquely divisible.  The later in 
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time after an event that a source releases information the more information from preceding 
sources tends to be included.  For instance, academic studies, which are among the last to 
appear, will include information from all sources.  Marked with red in the table are those 
sources that fully depend upon preceding sources in order to provide value-added 
information.  For those sources, the time-frame availability is in addition to the time required 
for acquiring the data that the source is based upon.   
A common source of information for responders is the situation reports produced 
by UN OCHA15.  These reports are a medium for information from other sources, such as 
seismological institutions and governmental appeals, to be disseminated.  This is an example 
of a situation when the information source is different from the information medium.   
                                                          
15 Personal communication in November 2003 with P.A Berthlin 
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Table 6: Data availability and Quality over time 
Time-frame of 
availability 
Data Quality 
Completeness 
Data Source 
Min Max Accuracy 
Disaster? Needs? 
Epicentre, Magnitude, 
Time 
Remotely sensed 
seismic data 
Seconds Minutes Intermediate Low16 None 
Depth and improved 
Epicentre and Magnitude 
Remotely sensed 
seismic data 
Minutes Hours High Low16 None 
Affected population 
estimate 
Automated loss and 
needs assessment 
+ minutes + hours Low Low Low 
Mortality estimate Automated loss and 
needs assessment 
+ minutes + hours Low Intermediate Low 
Mortality, Injury and 
Building loss estimates 
Automated loss and 
needs 
assessment17 
+ minutes + hours Intermediate Intermediate Low 
Situational accounts  On-site 
representatives 
Minutes Hours High High Intermediate 
Textual eye-witness 
accounts 
Media Minutes Days Low High Intermediate 
Injured; dead; homeless; 
buildings and/or villages 
damaged or destroyed. 
Loss assessment 
by Government  
Hours 13 days Intermediate High Intermediate 
Injured; dead; homeless; 
buildings and/or villages 
damaged or destroyed. 
On-site loss 
assessment by 
Coordinating body 
3 days 4 days High High Intermediate 
List of needed relief items 
and expertise. 
National 
Government appeal 
Hours 16 days Intermediate High High 
List of needed relief items 
and expertise. 
On-site needs 
assessment 
3 days 4 days High High High 
List of dispatched material 
and shortfalls 
Coordinating body 1 day 6 days High High High 
Post disaster maps for 
navigational purposes 
Remotely sensed 
optical imagery 
2 days Weeks High High High 
Post disaster maps with 
estimated structural 
damage 
Expert interpreted 
Remotely sensed 
optical and radar 
imagery 
+Hours +Days Intermediate High High 
Building damage type and 
cause 
Structural survey Weeks Months High High High 
 Academic reports Weeks ∞ High High High 
 
                                                          
16 The Completeness is High if taking into account the non-disaster events that could be excluded. 
17 With human expert enhancement. 
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Table 7 Definition of applied terminology for data quality 
 Definition None Low Intermediate High 
Accuracy Percentage of the studied cases where the reported 
value (when taking into account the reported 
confidence interval) did not correspond to the final 
value. 
N/A <60% 61-80% >80% 
Completeness Percentage of the studied cases where the 
accumulated data would have been sufficient to form 
the basis for: 
1. answering whether there will be a need for a 
international response —i.e. is the event a 
disaster? 
2. a formal needs assessment. 
0% <60% 61-80% >80% 
 
 
 Figure 1 shows how the difference between the available minimum and maximum 
values of a generic indicator changes over time.  The only general rule for the difference 
between the maximum and minimum is that it eventually reaches zero when a definite value 
is agreed upon.  The average time for this is in the cases studies were, depending on the 
severity of the event and the variable in question, about a week.  Before reaching that state, 
the difference fluctuated.  Based on the earthquakes studied it is impossible to identify 
consistent errors in the reporting of a given group of sources.  A source that gives the 
minimum in one disaster might not do so in another.   
0
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Figure 1: Envelope of indicator value, days after a case study event18 
                                                          
18 Minimum and maximum number of injured reported in the 2002 Quazvin, Iran earthquake. 
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7.2 Decision process in the case studies 
No indications of decision makers having used advanced DSS operationally in any 
of the case studies were found.  There are cases where DSS were used for research purposes.  
Examples of this are the 2003 Boumerdes earthquake in Algeria, and the 2001 Badin 
earthquake (epicentre in Gujarat, India).  However, in those events the DSSs were only tested 
and thus not used for making operational decisions.  The natures of the systems applied in 
the two events were such that they would not have worked without supervision and 
interpretation by experts.  Instead it was found that several organisations19 use the simplest 
forms of DSS — an alert system based on magnitude alone.   
The absence of evidence of the use of advanced DSS tools accounts for not only the 
model-based tools reviewed as part of this study, but also to other common applications 
such as the HazUS (FEMA 2003), CATS (Swiatek and Kaul 1999), and EPEDAT (Goltz et al. 
1997)20.  Instead, the most important sources of information, based on how the actions of the 
international organisations corresponded to information from a certain source, seem to have 
been either local government or an international co-ordinating body, often the UN OCHA.   
Through interviews with relief organisations, it became clear that the most valued 
sources for estimating initial need are in-country contacts, such as country representatives 
paired with information from relief networks, such as the OCHA Virtual Operations On-Site 
Coordination Center (Virtual OSOCC) and the more general ReliefWeb.  
7.3 What governed the decision in the case studies? 
No clear correlation was found between any of the measured aspects of the studied 
events and the response reported by OCHA.  Intense media attention tended to accompany 
large financial responses, but the direction of this correlation is not clear. 
                                                          
19 Personal communication in November 2003 with P.A Berthlin, rapid response asset manager, Swedish Rescue Services 
Agency (SRSA) and in February 2004 with Fidel Suarez of the Spanish rescue service. 
20 None of these systems provides global operability as standard. 
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8 Discussion 
From Table 6, it is clear that a strategic decision-maker will seldom be able to take 
advantage of remotely sensed imagery in the immediate aftermath of a disaster.  This is 
mainly due to the amount of time required to acquire and then to interpret an image.  To 
benefit from remotely sensed imagery within hours after a disaster, one currently has to 
resort to using a pre-event image, if available, of high-resolution.  Such an image will only be 
useful for navigation purposes, and, possibly, to provide an overview of settlements located 
in remote areas.   
In cases where existing mapping is inadequate, remotely sensed imagery can be 
useful in supporting the tactical decision-makers in logistic tasks.  There can be situations 
where more time is available.  If a decision to respond is not taken within a couple of days, it 
will be feasible to consider the use of analysed image pairs.  An example of a situation where 
a decision can drag on time is a case with a widespread affected area or a case with damage 
on local infrastructure that inhibits the ability of launching reconnaissance efforts on the 
ground.  In such a case, the days that are required to process and analyse the images are 
inferior to the number of days that would be required to reach all the areas by land.  If 
suitable pre-disaster imagery is unavailable the post-disaster imagery will be virtually 
useless for loss assessment since the accuracy of the loss assessment models that build solely 
on a post-event image is still too low unless the structural damages are extreme.   
If remotely sensed imagery is not useful for supporting decisions in the initial 
phases of international response to a typical rapid-onset disaster, the alternative solution is 
to make the most out of on-site sources combined with loss and needs assessment models.  
The models require human analysis in order to achieve high accuracy.  Since it is impossible 
to wait for all sources to agree on the loss and needs created by a disaster, how much time is 
optimally spent on acquiring information from the sources that precedes the remote sensed 
imagery - such as the opinions of human experts and more advanced DSS?  Sources, other 
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than needs assessment models such as those presented in Table 5 and remote sensing, that 
possibly could deliver information include media, government, and country representatives.  
However, the subjectivity and accuracy of media, and, sometimes, local government, are 
questionable.  In the first hours after a disaster it is unrealistic to expect that a country 
representative, in a context with imperfect infrastructure, will be in a position to both have 
an overview of the situation and be able to communicate with a decision-maker on another 
continent.  Nevertheless, these sources can be useful for calling off a disaster alert.  If the 
initial sources —i.e. models —indicate it being possible that an event is a disaster whilst the 
media reporters, government officials, and ambassadors claim that little or no damage has 
occurred, one could conclude that the on-site sources are more likely to be correct.  If on the 
contrary are direct indications from the on-site sources of damage or if a “black hole” 
situation arise there is good reason to put response resources on alert while the investigation 
continues. 
The sources becoming available, between model output and the satellite-based 
assessments can therefore assist in excluding non-disaster events or indicate potential 
disaster events, but it is not certain that they will be able to provide an accurate needs 
assessment if international relief is required.  It is important to be clear that though 
information sources provide output of differing quality, a source with higher quality is not 
necessarily better than sources of inferior quality.  The purpose of the faster sources can be 
seen to be to alert the more exact and time consuming sources of an event that perhaps could 
be a disaster.   
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9 Conclusion 
To be effective, a decision on whether to intervene and how to intervene in the 
aftermath of a disaster, an “entry” decision, has to be taken within a limited amount of time.  
This amount of time is a function of the window of time in which the supplied type of aid is 
effective minus the reaction time of the responders - which includes the travel time to the 
disaster zone.  If no direct communication with a source that has correct and indisputable 
information on the disaster situation is possible, an “entry” decision has to be taken based on 
the information at hand.  Model-based decision support systems are hence of importance for 
“entry” decisions in that they provide an early alert that enables other sources to provide 
more refined information.  Human experts can improve the output of the models, but this 
will be at the cost of time.   
Remotely sensed imagery will only be useful for the strategic decision-maker if a.) 
the time required to make the analysed material available to the decision maker is reduced to 
a matter of hours; or b.) the area of interest is so remote or widespread that the time required 
for on-site reports exceeds that of acquiring and interpreting remotely sensed imagery. 
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Abstract 
If time-sensitive relief is to be dispatched to a far-away location, the decision to do so – the “entry” decision 
– has to be taken within hours after the disaster for the relief to make an impact.  This paper aims to 
identify which information sources that become available to the decision maker at what time after a 
potential disaster, and to establish how the provided information can be best utilized based on its inherent 
and accumulated quality.  The research encompasses 46 case studies in central Asia in the period from 
1993 to 2003.  The study makes clear that a decision-maker will only benefit from satellite imagery if the 
time required to deliver a digested product to the decision maker is reduced to a matter of hours or if the 
area of interest is so remote or widespread that the time necessary for on-site reports exceeds that of 
acquiring and interpreting remotely sensed imagery.  In conclusion, model-based decision support 
systems are important since they provide an early alert that enables other sources to quicker provide 
information that is more refined.  
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